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Available online 28 July 2016Dual process accounts of the alcohol-behaviour link hypothesise that differences in drinking patterns will mod-
erate the effects of exposure to alcohol-related cues on behaviour, such as when a placebo is administered. We
test this hypothesis by adapting a paradigm used in alcoholmyopia research to examine the effects of alcohol-re-
lated priming on self-enhancement behaviour amongst social drinkers. Participants were asked to engage in a
computerised self-rating task prior to being exposed to alcohol related and/or motivational primes. A staged
computer error then occurred, and participants were then asked to complete their self ratings again – this meth-
od allowed for an immediate assessment of the impact of alcohol andmotivational primes on self enhancement.
As predicted by alcoholmyopia theory, the overall effect of priming with alcohol-related cueswas not signiﬁcant
irrespective of response-conﬂict manipulations. However, drinker type moderated this effect such that heavier
drinkers self-enhancedmore after exposure to alcohol-related cues, but only inhigh-conﬂict conditions. This sug-
gests that the efﬁcacy of a placebo may be signiﬁcantly moderated by individual differences in reactions to alco-
hol-related stimuli, and that dual process accounts of the effects of alcohol on behaviour better explains this
variation than alcohol myopia theory.







PrimingAlcohol is necessary for a man so that he can have a good opinion of
himself, undisturbed be the facts.
[Finley Peter Dunne, Humorist and Writer, 1867–1936]
An association between alcohol consumption and behavioural
change is perhaps self-evident. Not only do we intuitively know that
the consumption of alcohol leads to changes in individuals' behaviour,
but there is a signiﬁcant body of evidence which supports this assump-
tion. For example, administration of alcohol in laboratory settings has
been shown to increase helping behaviour (Steele, Critchlow, and Liu,
1985), decrease cooperation amongst groups (Hopthrow, Abrams,
Frings, and Hulbert, 2007) and is associated with increased aggression
(e.g. Bushman and Cooper, 1990). However, a particular difﬁculty in
this ﬁeld of research is that these associations are neither universal,
nor consistentwithin individuals over time. This variability in responses
to alcohol, both within and between individuals, was perhapsmost viv-
idly illustrated byMacAndrewand Edgerton (1969) in their seminal an-
thropological work. Throughout their text, the authors systematicallyLondon South Bank University,
. This is an open access article underpresented evidence which at once conﬁrmed and refuted a range of dif-
ferent drunken stereotypes – illustrating that hardly any truisms about
alcohol are true all of the time. It is therefore vital that theories
attempting to explain the effects of alcohol on behaviour must be able
to account for this variability.
Alcohol myopia theory (Steele and Josephs, 1990) has tried to ex-
plain the alcohol—behaviour link by positing that alcohol diminishes
our capacity to process information, so our attention is drawn to only
the most salient behavioural cues. Myopia theory also states that be-
havioural change is not inevitable under conditions of alcohol con-
sumption and is only hypothesised to occur when impelling and
inhibiting behavioural cues are near-equally salient – in the lan-
guage of myopia theory, when response conﬂict is high. Response
conﬂict occurs in circumstances where individuals are faced with
more or less competing behavioural response options. Myopia theo-
ry posits that it is only when there are strongly competing alterna-
tives (i.e. high response conﬂict) that alcohol consumption affects
behaviour. In such situations, ones limited cognitive capacity (the
psychopharmacological effect of alcohol consumption) will be
diverted to only one set of cues leading to extreme responses
which are not moderated by other information (e.g. Steele and
Southwick, 1985). The counter-intuitive prediction of myopia theory
is, therefore, that when response conﬂict is high an individual should
behave the same as, or even more prudently than, they would when
sober (e.g. MacDonald, Fong, Zanna, and Martineau, 2000).the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
38 A.C. Moss et al. / Addictive Behaviors Reports 4 (2016) 37–43In an attempt to provide a reconceptualisation of the
alcohol—behaviour link, we (Moss and Albery, 2009, 2010) have argued
that the evidence for myopia theory is persuasive to the extent that,
under conditions of high response conﬂict, individuals have been shown
to respond in a myopic fashion (see Steele and Southwick (1985), for a
meta-analytic review). However, one weakness in the myopia literature
is that individual expectations are not taken in to accountwhen consider-
ing behavioural changes. Research in the alcohol expectancy literature
has demonstrated that the expected effects of alcohol predict behavioural
change when participants are led to believe that they have been or are
currently consuming alcohol. For example, the alcohol-aggression link
has been shown to be moderated by expectations that aggression will
occur after drinking (Quigley and Leonard, 2006). Furthermore, the use
of subliminal priming techniques has shown that expectancy effects per-
sist when individuals are not aware that alcohol-related thoughts are ac-
tive in memory (Friedman, McCarthy, Förster, and Denzler, 2005). We
posit that, unlike myopia effects which are limited to conditions of actual
consumption of alcohol, expectancies operate both before and after the
consumption of alcohol begins (labelled the Pre-consumption and Con-
sumption phases of drinking). Therefore, whilst myopia researchers
have traditionally predicted (and indeed found) no behavioural changes
under control and placebo conditions, expectancy theory makes no such
prediction. On the contrary, expectancy research typically demonstrates
that behaviour changes as a function of beliefs about alcohol consump-
tion, irrespective of whether it has actually been consumed.
Given the evidence that expectancies can affect complex social be-
haviours, we argue that it is possible that many of the effects observed
in the myopia literature may be in part driven by the activation of ex-
pectancies, rather than beingwholly dependent on the effects of alcohol
consumption.We argue that expectanciesmoderate the effects of expo-
sure to alcohol-related cues (including but not limited to actual drink-
ing) on behaviour and decision making. In other words, the
implication of expectancy research is that alcohol-related behavioural
change is not merely the result of impairments in cognitive processing
as posited by myopia theory. As we (Moss and Albery, 2009) have ar-
gued, the utility of expectancy theory is that it allows for an extension
of alcohol myopia theory to include behavioural change under condi-
tions of exposure to alcohol-related stimuli irrespective of actual alcohol
consumption (e.g. cues in a bar environment, or thoughts about con-
suming alcohol). For example, Monk and Heim (2013) demonstrated
that alcohol expectancies change when measured in alcohol-related
vs. non-alcohol-related contexts, suggesting that alcohol-related behav-
iour change is indeed not dependent upon actual consumption. Howev-
er, whilst expectancy theory is useful in this regard, it is not well suited
to explaining the strong effects of response conﬂict, accounted for by
myopia theory. Rather, expectancy research typically asserts that the ac-
tivation of alcohol-related expectancieswill predict behavioural change,
and response conﬂict in paradigms testing the theory is not accounted
for, or directly manipulated.
We suggest here that the effects of exposure to alcohol related cues
and the consumption of alcohol will be moderated by expectancies
about the effects of alcohol, but only under conditions of high response
conﬂict. As demonstrated by the myopia literature, high response con-
ﬂict is necessary for behavioural change to be observed, as the absence
of such conﬂict will, by deﬁnition, mean that there are no salient com-
peting response options apparent to the individual. However, contrary
to the suggestions of myopia theory, behavioural change in our model
is not limited to conditions of actual alcohol consumption. To test
these predictions, we replicated a study from the alcohol myopia litera-
ture (Banaji and Steele, 1989) which had previously shown behavioural
change only under conditions of alcohol consumption (and not in a pla-
cebo condition) and high response conﬂict, to examinewhether the ac-
tivation of alcohol-related representations could lead to the same kind
of behavioural change when no alcohol had been administered. That
is, we predicted that seemingly myopic responding could occur under
conditions of sobriety.1. The current study
Inmyopia research, it is common to use placebo groups to control for
the belief that alcohol is being or has been consumed. However, based
on expectancy models of alcohol-related behaviour change, this kind
of experimental control would be inadequate to control for individual
differences in the expected effects of consuming alcohol. In other
words, placebo groups in the alcohol myopia literature are not homoge-
neous. Given the evidence from the expectancy literature that alcohol-
related representations in memory differ widely between individuals
(Rather and Goldman, 1994), it must be assumed that a placebo
would affect participants in different ways based on the expectancies
which they hold in relation to alcohol consumption. Speciﬁcally, heavier
drinkers tend to hold more strongly active alcohol-related representa-
tions inmemory (Christiansen, Goldman,& Inn, 1982) and showgreater
reactivity to alcohol-related cues (e.g. Rather and Goldman, 1994;
Sharma, Albery, & Cook, 2001).
Following this reasoning we argue that placebos in alcohol research
serve to activate alcohol-related representations, including expectan-
cies, in memory. We also posit that the nature of the expectancies acti-
vated, and the degree to which they affect behaviour, will vary as a
function of past drinking. In order to test our primary hypothesis that in-
dividual differences in drinking behaviour will moderate the effects of
expectancies on behaviour, we sought to directly activate alcohol-relat-
ed expectancy representations using a supraliminal priming strategy. If
placebo effects are caused by the activation of expectancies, then the di-
rect activation of suchmental representations should be capable of pro-
ducing a ‘placebo-like’ response. To achieve this we adapted one of the
classic tests of alcohol myopia by Banaji and Steele (1989) which dem-
onstrated that alcohol consumption led to self-enhancement under high
response conﬂict. Our model suggests that similar response patterns
should be shown under high response conﬂict conditions, in the ab-
sence of actual alcohol consumption, when participants are exposed to
drinking-related cues. This effect would be stronger for heavier social
drinkers because of their increased reactivity to drinking-related cues
compared to lighter social drinkers.
In their original study Banaji and Steele (1989) asked participants
to rate a number of trait dimensions for personal importance, and to
provide both ideal and actual self ratings. During a later alcohol ad-
ministration session, participants were asked to provide actual self
ratings again whilst being presented with their original ideal and ac-
tual self ratings. Response conﬂict was considered to be high when a
participant had identiﬁed a trait as being important and where there
was a large self-reported discrepancy between their actual and ideal
self ratings. As such, participants were faced with competing goals to
(a) provide accurate and truthful responses given their previous rat-
ings; and (b) to reduce the ideal-actual self-discrepancy for a trait
they had identiﬁed as important. Low response conﬂict traits were
those which were unimportant and had a low self-reported actual-
ideal discrepancy.
Amongst those participants who were given alcohol, signiﬁcant in-
creases in actual self ratings were shown for those traits where there
was a high level of response conﬂict (i.e. where the traits were rated
as being important, and a high ideal-actual discrepancy was evident).
Such self enhancement effects were not found for low conﬂict traits,
or at all amongst the placebo and control groups. Moreover, as is the
case in most myopia research, no direct analysis was conducted on the
basis of drinker type differences, meaning that whilst a placebo per se
did not affect responding, it is not possible to conclude from their ﬁnd-
ings that this was the case for all participants in that condition. This is a
fundamental omission given theﬁndings from the expectancy literature
that exposure to alcohol-related information differentially affects differ-
ent types of drinker, and the claims made in our model which suggest
that such expectancy differences should be evident under conditions
of high response conﬂict even if no alcohol has been consumed. To ad-
dress this issue, in the present study we sought to partially replicate
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ferences in drinking on responses under high and low conﬂict.
2. Method
2.1. Design
A mixed-factor design was used with prime condition (alcohol-re-
lated priming, motivational priming, both, neither) and drinker type
score as between-participants factors and response conﬂict condition
(low, high) as awithin-participants factor.Motivational primingwas in-
cluded in this study as an additional control, to determine whether the
novel procedure developed for this studywas capable to generating self
enhancement responses, independently of alcohol-related self en-
hancement. The dependent variables were mean self-enhancement
scores for low- and high-conﬂict traits. All participants gave ratings for
40 traits regarding: (a) Their importance to the individual, (b) their
ideal self-rating, (c) their actual self-rating prior to priming, and (d)
their actual self-rating after priming. In between (c) and (d) participants
were primed according to the relevant condition. Motivation and alco-
hol-related primes were counterbalanced for the group receiving both.
Presentation of traits within each block and assignment to the four
priming conditions was randomised.
2.2. Participants
Sixty undergraduate psychology students (45 females, 15 males;
mean age = 24.23, SE = 0.80) participated in exchange for course
credits. Although thereweremore females thanmales, themale-female
ratiowas equal across the priming conditions (range of 20–26%males in
each condition). Non-drinking participants were excluded, but to avoid
making participants aware of the alcohol-related nature of the study by
directly asking about drinking patterns a general health questionnaire
was administered, ostensibly for another researcher in the department.
This asked ten questions about health-related behaviours (e.g. amount
of exercise taken, diet, and alcohol consumption). Participants who re-
ported that they did not drink alcohol were not required to continue.
Potential problem drinkers were screened using the AUDIT question-
naire (Saunders, Aasland, Babor, de la Fuente, and Grant, 1993; M =
7.2, SD= 5.2), with scores of 21 or over suggesting potentially depen-
dent drinking. No participants were excluded on this basis. All partici-
pants provided informed consent for participating in the study, and
the research protocol was approved by the University Research Ethics
Committee.
2.3. Measures
Drinker type was calculated using the ﬁrst two questions of the
AUDIT questionnaire, which assess quantity and frequency of drinking.
For the purposes of comparing heavy and light drinkers, a median split
of quantity-frequency scores was applied.
Self enhancement scoreswere used to assess the degree towhich ac-
tual self ratings changed before and after the staged computer error.
Scores were calculated using the ideal self-rating as a baseline for each
individual trait, such that a positive self enhancement score represented
a shift towards the ideal self ratings from the ﬁrst to the second actual
self ratings (i.e.more positive actual self ratingswas given on the second
occasion), and a negative score represented amove away from the ideal
self ratings (i.e. more negative actual self ratings after the staged error).
2.4. Stimuli and apparatus
A pool of trait pairs was formed using a thesaurus to search for anto-
nyms of 106 adjectives describing personal characteristics. Ten inde-
pendent judges rated whether the ﬁrst word in each pairing was a
good example of the second using a 5-point Likert scale. Word pairswhich described a similar characteristic (e.g. introvert – extrovert and
quiet – outgoing) were identiﬁed, and ratings for each were compared
and the pair with the lowest rating was rejected. The forty traits pairs
with the highest ratings were retained. The paradigm was constructed
using the experiment generation software E-Prime v1.1 (Schneider,
Eschman, and Zuccolotto, 2002).
In the scrambled sentence task participants were presented with
ﬁve words andwere asked to use four to form a sentence. Thirty scram-
bled sentences were created, with twenty containing a negative word
(e.g. wicked, liar) next to a self-oriented word (I, me) to prime the mo-
tivation to self-enhance (e.g. “psychopath I evil a is”). Participants were
not able to construct a grammatically correct sentence using the self-
orientatedword. The use of the self-orientatedwordswas based on pre-
vious research suggesting that self-enhancement is more pronounced
when individuals believe information to be personally relevant (see
Geers, Handley, and McLarney, 2003). The AUDIT was administered to
all participants either at the end of the experiment, or during the appro-
priate priming phase to prime alcohol-related representations. Impor-
tantly, the AUDIT asks questions about behaviours and consequences
that would require a participant to reﬂect back on past drinking. Alter-
native priming methods were considered, such as placing bottles of al-
cohol in the vicinity of the participants. This and similar methods were
rejected on thebasis that there could be no reliable and objective assess-
ment of whether participants had attended to the prime, and/or that
they would make the aims of the study obvious to participants. The
use of questionnaires as a priming tool allowed us to maintain the de-
ception that these questionnaires were entirely unrelated to the main
study.
2.5. Supraliminal priming technique
The supraliminal priming technique used involved presenting par-
ticipants being presented with a scrambled sentence task, the AUDIT
questionnaire, both, or neither. These were presented to participants
as a seemingly unrelated task which was given to them whilst the ex-
perimenter attempted to repair a staged error which occurred during
the experiment (see below). To check that participants had not associ-
ated the priming task with themain experiment, a funnelled debrieﬁng
protocol was adopted (see Bargh and Chartrand, 2000).
In an initial pilot study to assess the utility of primes, we developed
and administered two scrambled sentence tasks to two groups of ﬁve
participants. Each group was told that the task was designed to assess
literacy skills. Of the ﬁve who received the sentences containing self-re-
lated words, none reported any suspicion that they had been misled.
However, amongst the ﬁve given the task containing drinking-related
words, three out of the ﬁve reported a suspicion that those sentences
were somehow important to the purpose of the task. On this basis, the
use of a drinking-related scrambled sentence task was rejected as par-
ticipants in themain studymight become consciously aware of the pur-
pose of the priming task for alcohol. Tomaintain the impression that the
primes being administered during the taskwere totally unrelated to the
primary task, we opted to use the AUDIT task as it was felt that this
would serve to prime alcohol-related representations in memory, but
could also be administered in such a way that it would appear to be a
credible separate task.
2.6. Procedure
After completing the general health questionnaire, participantswere
asked to complete a computerised task about self-image. The ﬁrst block
of this task required participants to give importance ratings for forty
trait dimensions, on a scale from “extremely unimportant” to “extreme-
ly important”. Ratings for each dimension were given using a series of
semantic differential scales on a computer screen. A response bar slider
which could be positioned on each of the semantic differential scales
was used by participants to indicate their rating for each dimension,
Table 1
Self-enhancement scores (millimetres) across priming conditions.
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
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their ideal self for each trait dimension on the semantic differential
scales bymoving the response slider to the required position on screen.
Participants then completed actual self ratings in the same way. Ideal
self ratings were displayed alongside each actual self-scale to remind
participants of their earlier responses, and to increase the salience of
discrepancies. After this block, a staged error message was displayed
on-screen stating that a “fatal memory error” had occurred and that
the last forty responses had not been saved.
At this point the experimenter asked the participant to move to an
adjacent desk, out of view of the computer screen, whilst they
attempted to repair the problem. A fake telephone call was made de-
scribing the problem and asking for advice. Participants in the priming
conditions were then given the appropriate questionnaires (scrambled
words questionnaire and/or the AUDIT), ostensibly for another experi-
menter in the department, with the explanation that this would occupy
them whilst the experimenter repaired the computer. Participants had
been previously informed at the start of the study that they would be
asked to complete one or two short questionnaires for another experi-
menter at the end of this study, though the nature of them was not
discussed. This was to minimise any suspicions aroused by the ques-
tionnaires being introduced after the error appeared, as they were
known about from the start of the study. Participants receiving no
primes were simply asked to wait for 3 min whilst the repairs were
made. Once the questionnaires were complete, participants were in-
formed that the actual self-responses had been lost, so they would
need to give these ratings again.
Upon completing the study, participants who had not completed the
AUDIT were asked to do so. A funnelled debrieﬁng protocol was then
followed and participants were asked to report whether they thought
that “the aims of the study were different from those stated at the out-
set”. Participants who thought that they had beenmisled were asked to
elaborate on their suspicions. A small proportion (b10%) stated that
they thought that there had been some deception in the study (e.g.
the computer error seemed “suspicious”). On further questioning, it
was found that these suspicions were non-speciﬁc, and no participants
mentioned that they suspected the questionnaires to have been in-
volved in the deception. Once the experimenter revealed that the ques-
tionnaireswere part of the studymanipulation, no participants reported
that they had guessed that this might have been be the case. No partic-
ipants were excluded from the study on the grounds that none were
aware of any relationship between the experimental variables.
3. Results
3.1. Data preparation
Responses were coded as the x-axis co-ordinate where participants
positioned the response bar slider. The response range was 128–
512 pixels. The response bar centrally occupied 60% of the screen
width which was 640 pixels in total. Self-enhancement scores are re-
ported in millimetres for ease of interpretation.
Most and least important traits (the upper and lower quartiles for
trait importance ratings) were identiﬁed for each participant, following
Banaji and Steele (1989). For each, the pre-priming discrepancy score
was then calculated as follows1:
jActual 1−Idealj1 Modulus, or absolute values (indicated by the vertical lines in the formulae), were
used in order to account for instances where individuals may report wanting to be lower
on a scale than they perceived themselves to actually be. For example, an individual rating
themselves as more intelligent than their ideal intelligence would be given a negative
score for discrepancy. Clearly, anymove towards the ideal is not an example of “deﬂation”,
but self-enhancement towards a notional ideal.For the most important traits, those with the highest pre-priming
discrepancy scores were retained, producing the high response conﬂict
trait category (i.e. high importance, high discrepancy). For the least im-
portant traits, those with the lowest discrepancy scores were retained,
producing the low response conﬂict trait category (i.e. low importance,
low discrepancy). Self inﬂation scores were calculated by subtracting
the post-priming discrepancy from the pre-priming discrepancy scores,
as follows:
jActual 1−Idealj−jActual 2−Idealj
Oneparticipant's datawas lost owing to a (genuine!) technical error.
Prior to analysis, the data were screened for normality using the Kolmo-
gorov-Smirnov test. Results were satisfactory for both the low-
[D(59) = 0.07, p N 0.05, n.s.] and high-conﬂict [D(59) = 0.08, p N 0.05,
n.s.] self-enhancement scores, showing that neither were signiﬁcantly
non-normal.
3.2. Drinking patterns data
To quantify drinker type, a quantity-frequency score was calculated
by summing the ﬁrst two questions of the AUDIT questionnaire (“How
often do you have a drink containing alcohol?” and “How many drinks
containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you are drink-
ing?”), using the AUDIT coding scheme. A one-way ANOVA on quanti-
ty-frequency score revealed no signiﬁcant differences across priming
conditions, F (3, 59) = 1.18, p N 0.05. Moreover, post hoc Bonferroni
comparisons revealed no signiﬁcant differences in quantity-frequency
scores between any of the priming conditions (ps N 0.3). The sample
comprised of non-problem social drinkers (AUDIT scores b 21; M =
7.58, SD = 6.10) who reported drinking on average 2–4 times a
month and, on those occasions, consumed between 3 and 4 drinks.
3.3. Effects of priming on self-enhancement
To test the hypotheses that: (a) Motivation priming would lead to
self-enhancement in both low- and high-conﬂict conditions, and (b)
that alcohol-related priming would not lead to self-enhancement in ei-
ther of the conﬂict conditions a 2 × 2 multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was conducted on the self-enhancement scores for the
low- and high-conﬂict conditions withmotivation prime (administered
or not) and alcohol-related prime (administered or not) as between-
participants factors. With the use of Pillai's criterion, the combined
DVs were signiﬁcantly affected by motivation priming, F (2, 54) =
5.35, p b 0.01, ηp2 = 0.17, demonstrating that motivational priming sig-
niﬁcantly increased self-enhancement scores with the combined DVs.
Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) of the low- and high-conﬂict
self-enhancement scores showed that motivation priming increased
self-enhancement in both low- [F (1, 55) = 4.04, p b 0.05, ηp2 = 0.07]
and high-conﬂict [F (1, 55) = 5.34, p b 0.05, ηp2 = 0.09] conditions.
There was no signiﬁcant effect of alcohol-related priming on self-en-
hancement for the combined DVs, F (2, 54) = 0.18, p N 0.05, ηp2 =
0.006, and this was true for both the low- and high-conﬂict conditions
(Fs b 0.30, ps N 0.05) conﬁrming the hypothesis derived from myopia
theory that exposure to alcohol-related cues would not create myopicPrime type N
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Motivation and
alcohol-related
14 8.64 (14.51) 9.09 (18.83) 8.20 (10.19)
Motivation 15 8.89 (9.21) 9.94 (8.40) 7.85 (10.03)
Alcohol-related 15 3.42 (8.18) 4.69 (7.41) 2.15 (8.95)
No priming 15 2.36 (7.83) 0.62 (7.42) 4.10 (8.25)
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hancement scores across priming groups.
No signiﬁcant interaction between motivation priming and alcohol-
related priming was detected for the combined DVs, F (2, 54) = 0.40,
p N 0.05, ηp2 = 0.06, which was again the case in both the low- and
high-conﬂict conditions (Fs b 0.70, ps N 0.05). This suggests that there
was no additive effect of alcohol-related and motivation priming.
3.4. Moderation analysis
To test the hypothesis that drinker type (operationalised as partici-
pants' quantity-frequency scores, see Method section for details)
wouldmoderate the effects of alcohol-related priming on self-enhance-
ment in low- and high-conﬂict conditions, a multivariate analysis of co-
variance (MANCOVA) was conducted on the high and low conﬂict self-
enhancement scores. Speciﬁcally, to examine the independent effects of
alcohol-related priming and drinker type on self-enhancement scores,
these main effects were entered into the MANCOVA model ﬁrst. Then,
to examine the moderation effects of drinker type on alcohol-related
priming for self-enhancement the two-way interaction term alcohol-re-
lated prime × drinker type was then entered in to themodel as a covar-
iate (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Finally, to conﬁrm whether motivation
priming and alcohol-related priming produced any additive effects on
self-enhancement the three-way interaction term, alcohol-related
prime × motivation prime × drinker type, was entered into the model.
For thismodel, with the use of Pillai's criterion, alcohol-related prim-
ing had no signiﬁcant effect on the combined DVs, F (4, 106) = 2.20,
p N 0.05, ηp2 = 0.08. This was also the case in both low- and high-conﬂict
conditions, replicating the previous MANOVA results (Fs b 2.9,
ps N 0.05). Also with the use of Pillai's criterion, drinker type did not sig-
niﬁcantly effect the combined DVs, F (2, 52)= 1.71, p N 0.05, ηp2 = 0.06.
Again, this result was consistent across both low- and high-conﬂict con-
ditions (Fs b 3.5, ps N 0.05).The interaction term, alcohol-related prime
× drinker type did not signiﬁcantly adjust the combined DVs, F (2,
52) = 2.2, p N 0.05, ηp2 = 0.08. However, univariate analyses of covari-
ance (ANCOVA) of this interaction on the low- and high-conﬂict scores
showed that, in the high-conﬂict condition, the interaction signiﬁcantly
adjusted self-enhancement scores, F (1, 53)= 4.28, p b 0.05, ηp2 = 0.08.
No signiﬁcant interaction was identiﬁed in the low-conﬂict condition, F
(1, 53)=0.01, p N 0.05,ηp2 b 0.001. Given the absence of themain effects
of drinker type and alcohol-related priming, and a signiﬁcant alcohol-
related prime × drinker type interaction, this conﬁrms the hypothesis
that the effect of alcohol-related priming on self-enhancement is mod-
erated by drinker type, such that heavier drinkers self-enhanced more
in the high-conﬂict condition.2 This moderation effect in the high-con-
ﬂict condition is illustrated in the left-most panels of Fig. 1 which
show that the increase in self-enhancement scores were associated
with the presence of alcohol-relate priming as a function of drinker
type.
Finally, the 3-way interaction for alcohol-relatedprime×motivation
prime × drinker type signiﬁcantly adjusted the combined DVs, F (4,
106) = 3.71, p b 0.01, ηp2 = 0.12, suggesting that motivation priming
and alcohol-related priming had interactive effects on self-enhance-
ment when drinker type was included in the model. Univariate
ANCOVAs revealed that this effect was signiﬁcant in the high-conﬂict,
F (2, 53)= 4.67, p b 0.05, ηp2 = 0.15, and not the low-conﬂict condition,
F (2, 53)=2.57, p N 0.05, ηp2=0.09. Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship be-
tween drinker type and high-conﬂict self-enhancement across the
priming conditions. The nature of the 3-way interaction reported here2 In order to establish that this effect was not simply the result of individuals with
higher AUDIT scores being primed with more negative information (i.e. responding afﬁr-
matively to more questions relating to negative consequences of drinking in the alcohol
prime conditions), these analyses were conducted again with AUDIT, rather than drinker
type scores, as themoderator variable. No signiﬁcantmain effects or interactions involving
AUDIT scores were obtained, suggesting that higher AUDIT scores per se were not related
to increased self-enhancement.is clearly seen in the left hand panels, whereby a greater effect of prim-
ing as a function of drinker typewas seen in the bottom left panel when
both priming techniques were applied, in contrast to alcohol-related
priming alone, illustrated in the top-left panel.
4. Discussion
In accordance with the predictions of alcohol myopia theory, when
social drinkers were exposed to an alcohol-related prime, we found no
myopic effect on their self-enhancement behaviour. Consistent with
our hypothesis, the effect of alcohol-related priming on responding
was signiﬁcantly moderated by drinker type. That is, heavier drinkers
demonstrated myopic responding, under conditions of high response
conﬂict in the absence of any actual alcohol consumption. These results
suggest that future work examining the impact of placebo and actual al-
cohol administration on human performance should explicitly consider
themoderating effects of drinker type or drinker status for understand-
ing the relationship between exposure to and consumption of alcohol.
Importantly, based on a direct manipulation of exposure to alcohol-
related information, our study suggests a pattern of behavioural re-
sponses whilst not under the inﬂuence of alcohol, which resemble
those previously only found under conditions of alcohol consumption
(e.g. Banaji and Steele, 1989). Such effects when under conditions of al-
cohol administration have previously been accounted for according to
the principles of alcoholmyopia theory. Importantly, these ﬁndings sug-
gest that myopic-type responding may not be entirely due to the
impairing effects of alcohol per se, but in certain individuals, responses
may also be tied to previously held expectations associated with en-
countered alcohol-related cues. As a relatively small pilot study, utilising
a novelmethodology, our ﬁndingswould beneﬁt from further testing to
determine the strength of this effect. A further limitation of this study is
the use of a student sample, with an age range suggestive of a relatively
inexperienced group of drinkers. Further work exploring the current
ﬁndings might take in to account drinking experience, which has a di-
rect impact on alcohol expectancies (e.g. Rather and Goldman, 1994),
as well as considering levels of exposure to alcohol-related cues, given
evidence suggesting differences in attentional processing related to al-
cohol amongst individuals who work in alcohol-related environments
(Albery, Sharma, Noyce, Frings, and Moss, 2015).
As highlighted in our dual process model (Moss and Albery, 2009), a
complete account of the alcohol—behaviour link can be more meaning-
fully derived from an account based upon both the myopia and expec-
tancy perspectives. On the one hand, the body of evidence supporting
myopia theory is problematic for the expectancy perspective which
says nothing about the psychophysiological impairments associated
with actual alcohol consumption. On the other hand the evidence pre-
sented in this paper demonstrates that expectancies might play a role
in the production of myopic-type responding under conditions where
no alcohol has been consumed. If one considers drinking behaviour as
a biphasic process, as suggested in our dual process model, then the
ﬁndings from previous research and this present study are complemen-
tary and provide a more complete account of the psychological and
pharmacological predictors of alcohol-related behaviour under condi-
tions of alcohol consumption and non-alcohol consumption.
Whilst in our discussion of the implications of this work we have
provided a preferred account of the relationship between exposure to
relevant cues and behavioural responding, it remains the case that an
important proportion of variance in behaviour remains unexplained
by themeasure of drinker type used here.We urge that in future studies
exploring the effect we have identiﬁed, more sensitive measures of ex-
pectancy or “drinker-type” be developed. For example, developingmea-
sures which correspond directly to the dependent variable of interest is
likely to result in a greater proportion of variance being accounted for
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). For instance, researchers interested in the
effects of alcohol consumption on intentions to use condoms may per-
haps consider assessing participants' attitudes towards condoms per
Fig. 1. Self-enhancement scores in the high-conﬂict condition as a function of drinker type across priming conditions (95% conﬁdence limits shown).
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risk-taking, to identify whether this moderates the effects of a placebo.
Further to this point, the choice of prime in studies such as this may
be equally important in determining the responses of participants –
the use of theAUDIT as a prime in this study clearly had an effect on par-
ticipants' responses, but it remains to be seen whether other drinking-
related primes (e.g. a bar or pub environment, or being exposed to
others consuming alcohol) might elicit similar responses.
In addition, we have yet to showwhether expectancies would mod-
erate the effects of actual alcohol consumption on behaviour, another
untested prediction generated by our model of the alcohol-behaviour
link (Moss and Albery, 2009). That is, it is not evident whether, as our
model predicts, the moderating effects of drinker type would continue
to inﬂuence responding under conditions of actual alcohol consump-
tion. Some evidence (e.g. Dermen and Cooper, 2000), based upon retro-
spective reports of response conﬂict, expectancies and drinking
patterns lends convergent support to the hypothesis that expectancies
and drinking patterns would moderate the effects of alcohol on behav-
iour, but as yet there have been no experimental studies to support this
prediction. This question, of the effects of expectancies on behaviour
over time as blood alcohol levels increase and decrease, reveals a further
unexplored question concerning the magnitude of inﬂuence of expec-
tancies. That is, do the effects of expectancies increase, decrease or re-
main the same during this time? In a discussion of this issue, two
opposing viewpoints have emerged.Wiers and Stacey (2010) have sug-
gested that expectancies are derived from the controlled processing sys-
tem, which is known to be weakened under alcohol and is consistent
with the idea that the effects of expectancies diminish as blood alcohol
levels increase. On the other hand, we (Moss and Albery, 2010) have ar-
gued that the operation of expectancies is not necessarily dependent
upon controlled processing. We argue for a more automatic operation
of expectancies as blood alcohol increases because of the proportional
weakening of controlled processes which might otherwise moderatethe effects of expectancies. To examine the relative validity of each per-
spective is important in terms of understanding the alcohol-behaviour
link and the relative importance of factors such as blood alcohol concen-
tration and expectancy operation both before and after drinking
commences.
In summary, this study provides evidence that myopic-type behav-
iour can be activated amongst certain types of drinker by simply prim-
ing them with alcohol-related cues. This is of particular signiﬁcance
since previously such responding had only been evidencedunder condi-
tions of actual alcohol consumption. That such effects were found only
amongst heavier drinkers supports the idea that alcohol-related repre-
sentations in memory are more readily accessible, and/or more easily
activated, amongst individuals who have more direct and frequent ex-
perience with alcohol.
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